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ABSTRACT
This paper presents the first results of our most recent research on the
Bilbao Stock Exchange (BSE) from its foundation in 1890 up to the Spanish
Civil War. We examine the origin of the Exchange and follow its evolution over
the first half-century of existence. To this end we introduce some of the stock
exchange indexes we have calculated for Bilbao and put them into comparative
perspective with the existing series on general economic and industrial activity
and the indexes for other Spanish exchanges for the period considered. These
comparisons show Bilbao’s evolution from a public debt-dominated market
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to an industrial exchange very much tied to regional development. Finally,
we contrast the degree of financial market integration associated with the
existing Spanish exchange indexes. Our analysis finds strong support for
considering the BSE index as an industrial index and little evidence of capital
market integration between the principal Spanish exchanges before the
1920s.
Keywords: Bilbao, stock exchange, origins, integration, capital markets,
Spain
JEL Code: N23, N24, E44, F36
RESUMEN
Este artı´culo presenta los primeros resultados de nuestra investigacio´n
ma´s reciente sobre la Bolsa de Bilbao desde su creacio´n en 1890 hasta la
Guerra Civil Espan˜ola. El trabajo examina los orı´genes de este mercado
bursa´til y su evolucio´n durante sus primeros cincuenta an˜os. Para ello pre-
sentamos algunos de los ı´ndices que hemos calculado para Bilbao, y los
situamos en perspectiva comparada con las series de actividad econo´mica
general y los ı´ndices de otras bolsas espan˜olas. Estas comparaciones mues-
tran su evolucio´n desde un mercado dominado por los valores pu´blicos a una
bolsa industrial muy vinculada a su desarrollo regional. Finalmente, con-
trastamos tambie´n su grado de integracio´n con otros mercados financieros.
Nuestros resultados avalan la hipo´tesis de que la Bolsa de Bilbao fue un
mercado dominado por la contratacio´n de valores industriales, y aportan
poca evidencia de una integracio´n financiera de las principales plazas
espan˜olas antes de los an˜os veinte.
Palabras clave: Bilbao, bolsa, origenes, integracio´n, mercados de
capital, Espan˜a
1. INTRODUCTION
The introductory nature of this paper is threefold. The research presented
here examines how and why the Bilbao Stock Exchange (BSE) was formed
and documents its early history up to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War
in July 1936. Second, we introduce a monthly stock exchange index for
Bilbao, which complements others available for Madrid and Barcelona. In
addition, we give detailed descriptions of the indexes constructed with daily
price data, so that indexes for Barcelona, Madrid and other Spanish stock
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exchanges may be reconstructed in a similar way — especially for the
interwar period. This will make it possible to perform comparisons with an
even higher data frequency in the future. Finally, we conclude with a formal
contrast of the degree and evolution of regional stock exchange integration in
Spain to confirm the hypothesis that Bilbao also formed part of the single
Spanish capital market.
Over the past 20 years Spanish financial historians have carried out
a systematic reconstruction of stock exchange indexes: Hoyo (2007) for
Madrid; Tafunell (1991, 2005), Castan˜eda and Tafunell (2001) and Hortala` i
Arau (2004) for Barcelona; and most recently Cuevas (2009) for Valencia.
Nevertheless, as Montero (2006, p. 12) commented fairly recently, there are
no such monthly or weekly indexes available for the BSE. All in all, the
history of the BSE has received little scholarly attention. Although a few
approximations have been made, their focus has been mostly descriptive
or narrative. Some work has been done on the organizational history by
Torrente Fortun˜o (1966), but there are no analytical studies that investigate
the exchange in its origins and its evolution up to the Spanish Civil War. A
minor exception is the study by Montero (2006), a more recent contribution,
which nevertheless reflects little more than a hastily assembled collection of
archive notes and anecdotes collected 25 years ago. No in-depth analysis has
been put forward to date. Our research aims at filling this gap and this paper
presents the progress made so far.
Although our objective was to put this regional stock exchange into
perspective using existing stock market historiographies, this approach
has revealed less homogeneity than we expected. The BSE was originally
conceived of as an image of the Madrid Stock Market, which was dominated
by public debt trading. However, in the early 20th century, Bilbao evolved
into a strongly industrial securities-driven exchange. We will show this, both
in terms of trading volumes and in terms of the general index’s ties to
industrial business cycles. A second preconceived assumption for the BSE
we expected to confirm was a high degree of regional integration among
the three major Spanish stock markets — Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid.
To our surprise, statistical evidence points towards capital market segmen-
tation in which each regional exchange seems very much bound to its eco-
nomic development, at least up to the 1920s and maybe again during the
1930s.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the origins of the
BSE and the institutional framework within which it emerged; section 3
presents the exchange’s microstructure and its evolution over time; section 4
introduces the method we have used for constructing our indexes and section
5 makes basic comparisons with related macroeconomic variables and other
regional indexes; penultimate section 6 examines the degree of market
integration we can infer with other existing indexes; and the final section
(section 7) concludes.
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2. THE BSE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN
WHICH IT EMERGED
The drive to establish a formal exchange in Bilbao began in the late 1880s.
It was led by a group of brokers who enlisted the support of prominent
businessmen from finance, banking, mining, shipping and industry before
approaching the government in 1890. Before that Bilbao had been one of a
number of informal exchanges that had developed in the various Spanish
provinces in the 1850s and 1860s, driven mainly by the construction of
railways and the emerging regional banking and public services (see Tortella
1973). These informal stock exchanges — bolsines — which were set up in
Bilbao, Santander, Saragossa, Seville and Valencia were small local markets
quite different from the official exchange in Madrid or the «free» exchange in
Barcelona and continued to subsist during most of the 20th century (Montero
1996; Gutie´rrez Sebares 2001; Hoyo 2001; Hortala` i Arau 2004; Cuevas 2009).
They were regulated by commercial law and traditional licensed brokers
controlled their stock trade.
By the 1870s Spain had developed a network of exchanges that mixed three
different types of markets: a French-style official stock exchange (Madrid); a
private stock market similar to those in common law countries (Barcelona);
and small local stock markets in other cities, regulated by institutions created
centuries ago. This complex regulatory framework was the result of a fusion of
forces in which imported foreign elements interacted with the previously
existing institutional settings. The result was not a hybrid system but a triple
scheme in which three different regulatory models coexisted1.
The mixture of heterogeneous traditions, local institutions and imported
legislation in the Spanish case shows that the analysis of the relationship
between legal institutions and financial performance must be conducted
carefully. It is difficult to categorize a country as belonging to a civil law or
common law tradition, as the legal origins literature has a tendency to do2.
The history of how stock market regulation was constructed reflects that
there was no single and unique path. For instance, at the beginning of the
19th century Belgium adopted a tightly government-controlled framework, fol-
lowing the Paris bourse model, but this institutional setting gradually evolved
into a more liberalized and unregulated model, more similar to that of the
common law countries. The Belgian regulatory framework changed again in the
1930s towards a more statist model (see Willems and Buelens 2009). Many
other countries followed a non-linear path in which adaptation and responses
to shocks were perhaps more relevant than the origins of their legal system3.
In Spain, the large regional variations in economic performance — that is,
1 See Rojo Cagigal (2008) for a detailed discussion of the origins of this unique triple system.
2 See the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1998) and more recently La Porta et al. (2008).
3 As Musacchio (2009) pointed out.
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the relatively early industrialization of Catalonia in the 1840s — the limited
capacity of governments to enforce law and strong local resistance to
centralization contributed to the establishment of a national stock market
regulatory framework, which cannot be categorized simply as civil law.
Like many other countries at the time, Spain had liberalized incorpora-
tion laws in the second half of the 19th century to meet the demands of the
emerging industries and services, which gave an important boost to security
trading. In parallel, the 1885 Code of Commerce introduced principles of
economic freedom such as the liberty to create markets or the freedom of
profession and contributed to the consolidation of this triple system.
Accordingly, any group of people could spontaneously organize a market
without legal authorization and article 74 of the Code expressly stated that
any merchant could operate in any stock trade without the explicit inter-
vention of licensed or official stock brokers. The only difference was that free
middlemen had no public authority to attest transactions. Only licensed
brokers or official stockbrokers, both designated by the government, could
notarize commercial transactions, but this did not mean that they held a
monopoly: unlicensed «free» stockbrokers could perform the same deals but
without the legal notarization (see Duque Domı´nguez 1986; Fugardo Estivill
1999). Consequently, the 1885 Code recognized de facto the existence of the
Mercado Libre de Valores de Barcelona — the Barcelona market in which free
brokers operated massively. At the same time it consolidated the statist
model of the Madrid Stock Exchange and did not change the main features
of the existing local stock exchanges. Although, theoretically, free brokers
could operate on all exchanges, and official and licensed brokers were able to
retain the monopoly that they had traditionally held with the exception of
Barcelona.
The BSE in its modern form was founded in 1890 when a group of bro-
kers, merchants and industrialists constituting a joint-stock company sub-
mitted a proposal to create an official exchange to the Spanish government.
The Spanish executive was interested in extending the official stock market
model established by the Code to other provinces in Spain because it
improved the scope of the placement of public debt and the initiative was
approved immediately. The BSE was officially founded on the 21 July 1890
and began operating in February 1891, becoming the second official
exchange in Spain 60 years after Madrid (see Torrente Fortun˜o 1966). The
founding of an official exchange in Bilbao has usually been regarded by
historians as a natural consequence of the rapid industrialization process,
which took place in the Basque region during the last third of the 19th century
(Montero 1996). Its creation is seen as an answer to the need to raise capital for
the nascent demands of mining, shipping and industrial concerns. Iron ore
exports had accelerated after 1876 and the expansion of local heavy industry
and the merchant shipping sector had continued. Industrial development
seemed to be the driving force for the creation of a formal capital market, more
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so if we take into account that until then the local banking industry had not
performed a very satisfactory role in financing industrialization. Self-finance
and the reinvestment of profits from iron ore exports and trade, urban pro-
prietors, rentiers or banks from other Spanish regions had constituted the main
sources of industrial capital until then (see Valdaliso 1993). All this could
lead us to believe that the BSE had been set up to better provide capital for the
rapidly expanding mining and shipping business and the emerging manu-
facturing sector.
Much to our surprise, however, the analysis of the early market structure
does not reveal a buoyant demand for private securities. Data show that,
between 1891 and 1897, 68.5 per cent of trading volume was carried out on
public debt; 17.8 per cent on company bonds; and just 13.7 per cent on
private stocks, of which an important part were stocks of a state monopoly,
the Compan˜ı´a Arrendatoria de Tabacos (Montero 1994, p. 52). According to
these sources, less than 10 per cent of the market volume was devoted to
private stocks linked to Basque industrialization. In iron ore mining, very
few of the Spanish companies were organized as joint-stock companies4.
Most firms were family-run companies or owned by investment groups in
which reinvestment of profits continued to prevail. In the shipping sector,
although seventy-four of the seventy-seven companies created between 1879
and 1889 were joint-stock companies, none of their stocks appeared on
Bilbao’s trading floor before 1899. The companies were relatively small and
ownership was extremely concentrated so that very few stocks were ever
traded. In the iron and steel industry, ownership was also highly con-
centrated and market transactions were similarly scarce. The shares of the
main iron and steel enterprise, Altos Hornos de Bilbao, were traded spor-
adically before 1895; and those of the second most important company,
Sociedad La Vizcaya, did not appear on the market until 1898. This evidence
suggests that trading in mining, shipping and the major steel companies — at
that time the most dynamic sectors — revealed little demand for risk capital.
Combining these observations with those of the remaining sectors, the
existing demand gives no indication as to why an official market was pre-
ferred to a free informal stock exchange or the traditional local exchange that
had existed before. There is, nevertheless, an important issue to be stressed.
The 1885 legislation had introduced more economic freedom whereby offi-
cial exchanges could be created in any Spanish city and new brokers (official
vs. licensed) gained immediate control over them. These new official brokers
were required to deposit greater guarantees than in the informal exchanges
but in return they received the monopoly of public debt trading. This change
in legislation introduced a potential strategy of opportunistic behaviour on
behalf of the richest brokers in the existing licensed brokers’ associations
4 Most of the important joint-stock mining companies were floated outside of Spain, that is,
Orconera Iron Ore, Luchana Mining, Socie´te´ Franco-Belge des Mines de Somorrostro.
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organized in traditional local markets. The commercial regulations of 1885
created an incentive for prosperous brokers — wealthy enough to pay a
surety ten times higher than that of a licensed broker — to promote an
official exchange and thereby become official stockbrokers, which implied a
monopoly on public debt trade. This was a particularly interesting strategy
taking into account that many of these exchanges served mainly as a mar-
ketplace for trading public bonds5. The creation of an official exchange
where more successful brokers could exclude their less-well-off competitors
from bond trade became a looming threat. In 1887, Valencia’s licensed
brokers came to an agreement to avoid this kind of self-interested behaviour
and consolidated a formal stock trading centre. That is, they negotiated and
set up their stock exchange on the basis of their previous trading system in
order to avoid the creation of an official exchange (Cuevas 2009, pp. 224-226).
In contrast, in Bilbao a small group of licensed brokers saw an opportunity to
take advantage of the new legislation and obtain a monopoly on public debt
trading. Their initiative was accompanied by three favourable circumstances:
the rest of the licensed brokers remained disorganised; the promoting group
received support from some of the more dynamic economic elites; and finally
they could count on the government’s interest in promoting new channels
for placing and trading public debt. Therefore, the BSE emerged as a split
within the local licensed stockbroker association (Colegio de Corredores de
Comercio)6. This initiative and the further evolution of the exchange over the
first decades of its existence discussed below shows a strong resemblance to
the strategy adopted by the Parisian agents de change operating in a similar legal
framework who captured the State and then lobbied successive governments to
enlarge the scope of their monopoly (Neal and Davis 2005, p. 298).
3. MICROSTRUCTURE
The adoption of a French-style model by the BSE had an important
impact on its later evolution. The high degree of power accumulated by
official brokers over time was one of the most relevant characteristics of its
institutional development during the first third of the 20th century. Once
Bilbao had obtained the status of an official market, the official brokers
immediately demanded their legal monopoly on public debt trading and no
longer tolerated trading by non-official brokers (see Torrente Fortun˜o 1966,
pp. 109-111). They also began exerting pressure to get the State to extend the
5 See Montero (1994) for Bilbao and Cuevas (2009) for a detailed discussion of the case of
Valencia and Gutie´rrez Sebares (2001) for Santander.
6 Something similar may have occurred in Barcelona in 1915: the Association of the Mercado
Libre de Valores affirmed in 1926 that the creation of an official exchange in Barcelona was the
result of a split within the Casino Mercantil. (Asociacio´n del Mercado Libre de Valores de Barcelona,
Anuario de 1926, p. 15; see Hortala` i Arau 2004).
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monopoly to all trading. Bilbao’s official stockbrokers achieved this objective
in 1910, when a decree established that in all cities with official exchanges
the Ministry of Public Works would appoint no more new licensed brokers —
their direct competitors. This sentenced the non-official brokers to extinc-
tion. In fact, by 1928 only official stockbrokers operated in Bilbao. The
decree also limited the maximum number of official stockbrokers to fifty for
Madrid and forty for Bilbao, supposedly to promote a more stable income for
them and reduce speculation. It also meant the de facto consolidation of the
monopoly on stock trading by official stockbrokers.
The official agents also established strong entry barriers. Access to the
profession required the passing of an entrance exam and the payment of a
substantial surety deposit. The 1928 National Stock Exchange Regulations
introduced further barriers. A four-fifths majority of association members
was required to obtain access to examination. By the same regulation official
brokers could now designate clerks or trainees who traded in their name,
that is, increase the volume of individual trading they could handle and
maintain the limit established for the number of official brokers, even as the
volume of trade increased7.
The official agents extended their control over the entire stock exchange
institution. As we have mentioned before, the BSE had been founded by a
joint-stock company, the Sociedad Ano´nima Bolsa de Comercio de Bilbao.
However, in 1892 this company transferred all its competences concerning
entrance and trading fees to the official stockbroker association, the Colegio
de Agentes de Cambio y Bolsa. The founding joint-stock company survived
because this was required by law, but the Colegio became the true owner of
the Exchange. The Colegio had its own legal entity and was financed by dues
collected from the agents calculated as a percentage of their earnings,
entrance fees and listing duties (Montero 1996, p. 66).
The agents also extended their control to the stock exchange building.
Between 1891 and 1905 trading moved through several locations in the old
city centre: the Arriaga theatre, an office space in the Plaza Nueva and a
room at the Banco de Bilbao headquarters. In 1903, the Junta Sindical
decided to construct a building in the Ensanche, the new urban expansion
area8. The neo-classical building was inaugurated in 1905 and it is still the
BSE’s main office today. The Colegio was the original owner of the building,
but the official brokers exerted pressure to hold individual property shares of
the building. In 1922, this objective was achieved by creating a joint-stock
7 It became common for official stockbrokers to choose their sons as trainees. These later went
on to occupy their father’s position after death or retirement. At least five of the eleven new official
stockbrokers nominated in the 1930s reflect this system of succession (Rodrı´guez Sastre 1944;
Torrente Fortun˜o 1966).
8 The government of the BSE was vested in the chambre syndicale — Junta Sindical — in charge
of enforcing internal regulations, conflict-solving, publishing the official bulletin and listing new
stocks.
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company, the Sociedad Ano´nima La Concordia, which owned the building
and whose stocks could only be sold in case of death or retirement (Torrente
Fortun˜o 1966, p. 185). To sum up, the new official middlemen managed to
eliminate competition from licensed and free brokers and established strong
barriers to entry in the profession. They became the de facto owners of the
building and even took measures so that their positions could become almost
hereditary. This is in clear contrast to Barcelona’s Stock Exchange situated in
the other emerging industrial region in Spain, where the division between
the property of the building and traders was maintained; licensed brokers,
official brokers, free middlemen and banks competed with one other; and
access to trading was generally open.
The BSE was governed by three official regulatory legislations up to the
Spanish Civil War. The first two were sanctioned by royal decrees in 1890 and
1902. From its origins the rules and regulations of the BSE followed those of
the Madrid Stock Exchange very closely. This provided the exchange from its
beginnings with clearly set parameters according to which business on the
exchange was to be carried out. These practices had been in place for 60 years
in Madrid when they were adopted and avoided the cumbersome process of
developing new procedures by trial and error. A third national regulatory
legislation was imposed in 1928 (see Rodrı´guez Sastre 1944, pp. 99-139).
Trading was carried out face-to-face on a trading floor. As we have seen
before, BSE was a listed exchange. Listing was one of the main functions
regulated by official exchanges and only listed stock could be traded.
Whereas listing of public debt required previous government authorization,
private stocks were first admitted by the exchange’s Junta Sindical and later
ratified by decree. The BSE authorities could list their own stock until 1928.
After that date the National Stock Exchange Regulation centralized this
function for all three official exchanges — Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid —
in the Madrid Stock Exchange’s chambre syndicale. Prices were determined
using an open outcry auction method: a potential buyer bid a specific price
for a stock and a potential seller asked a specific price for the stock. When the
bid and ask prices matched, a sale took place. If there were multiple bidders
or askers at the matched price, the sale was closed on a first-come-first-served
basis. Once a sale had been made, the details of the transaction were
recorded by each individual broker and then reported to the Stock Exchange
register to be quoted on the slate.
At the end of the trading session all brokers on the floor gave a full report
of their trading activities and the Stock Exchange authorities recorded all
sales, including the closing price and the trade volume for each traded
security. Trading took place in exchange rings (corros) designated for dif-
ferent securities and types of operation. The Junta Sindical established when
and where these corros worked. The parquet — an elevated wooden ring with
a balustrade — was reserved for official stockbrokers (Rodrı´guez Sastre
1944, pp. 67-71). Sessions were held Monday through Saturday from 11 am
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to 12.30 pm, with the exception of national and local holidays. After the
opening of the new building in 1905, the Junta decided to hold two addi-
tional sessions (bolsines) from 10 to 11 and from 16 to 18 hours. Other
changes were made in the following years adapting to trading activity and
regulatory changes. From the end of February 1921 to October 1923, a period
of very low trading, there was no session on Saturdays, which was also the
case for all summer sessions after 1923. We know that from 1921 on, sessions
were divided into three time slots: the first one for fixed interest securities
trading, the second for foreign exchange and the final session for all secu-
rities. Between 1914 and 1936 the highest annual number of sessions was
284 in 1918 and the lowest 228 in 19229.
Article 67 of the Code of Commerce established that a wide range of
products could be traded on an official exchange: public and municipal debt,
private bonds, private securities, bills of exchange, freights, insurances,
currencies, precious metals and merchandise. In practice, official exchanges
traded mainly in securities and, to a much lesser extent, however, in foreign
currencies10. Spot deals were the most common trading operation. Forward
transactions — usually 3-month deals — increased during booms, although
rarely represented more than a third of total traded volume.
As we have stated previously, during its early years as an official bourse
the BSE was primarily a market for public debt. However, in the latter years
of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century all Spanish stock
exchanges played an expanding role as private capital markets. This trans-
formation was a direct consequence of the concentration processes in the
banking sector, heavy industry, shipping activity and the insurance business.
At the same time the expansion of the electricity sector, which required
important network investments, led to a sharp increase in equity issuance
and trading.
In Madrid, for example, the number of listed companies increased from
60 in 1896 to 105 in 1906 (Carreras and Tafunell 2005, p. 823), with a
growing importance of mining, chemicals and industry in the overall trade
volume11. Trading in equities on the Madrid Stock Exchange increased from
57.5 million 1913 constant pesetas in 1899 (the highest volume registered
during the 19th century) to 297 million in 1900. During the first decade of the
20th century the volume of equities traded never dropped below 200 million
and up to the Spanish Civil War, with the exception of 1915, it never fell
below 100 million12. This transmits the idea of an important leap forward
around the turn of the century.
9 Boletines de Cotizacio´n Oficial de la Bolsa de Comercio de Bilbao and Informacio´n.
10 This is true throughout the period with the exception of a speculative phase from 1920 to
1923, when foreign currency trading (marks, pounds and francs) was high in the BSE.
11 Hoyo (2007), Statistical Appendix 2, pp. 153-154, although the weight of public stock trading
was still overwhelming.
12 Hoyo (2007), Statistical Appendix 1, p. 151.
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF THE SECURITIES TRADED ON THE BILBAO AND MADRID STOCK EXCHANGES, 1916-1935
Public bonds Company bonds Shares Total Index
Millions of
pesetas Percentage
Millions of
pesetas Percentage
Millions of
pesetas Percentage
Millions of
pesetas
19165100
Bilbao
1916-1918 54 17.7 49 17.0 231 65.3 334 154
1919-1921 42 12.7 42 12.0 312 75.3 396 182
1922-1924 86 41.5 49 23.7 72 34.8 207 95
1925-1927 93 34.8 57 22.7 109 42.4 259 119
1928-1930 90 29.1 53 16.4 173 54.5 316 145
1931-1933 45 30.3 18 12.6 84 57.1 147 67
1934-1935 53 26.6 31 15.1 116 58.3 199 91
Madrid
1916-1918 462 70.5 17 2.4 182 27.0 660 116
1919-1921 563 55.0 48 4.8 410 40.1 1,022 179
1922-1924 462 54.2 83 9.9 305 36.0 850 149
1925-1927 575 46.6 87 7.2 612 46.2 1,273 223
1928-1930 788 24.3 87 2.7 2,360 73.0 3,235 567
1931-1933 610 47.5 70 5.5 603 47.0 1,283 225
1934-1935 793 51.7 120 8.2 630 40.2 1,543 271
Source: Memorias de la Ca´mara de Comercio, Industria y Navegacio´n de Bilbao.
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In the Barcelona Exchange, an important number of shares of companies
in the mining sector and the electricity industry were traded for the first
time, which changed the traditional structure of this market. This put an
end to what Fontana La´zaro (1961, p. 61) denominated the «old Barcelona
Exchange». The previous predominance of railroad, public services, banks
and insurance stocks was reduced by equities from mining, electricity,
metalworking, chemicals and construction enterprises (Hortala` i Arau 2006).
The change was even more significant in the Basque region. The BSE
experienced a rapid conversion from a small market, which traded pre-
dominantly in public debt securities into an important market in private
securities. The banking sector experienced a process of formation, merging
and capitalization. Two important banks, Banco de Vizcaya and Cre´dito
de la Unio´n Minera, were founded and their securities were listed on the
Exchange. In the iron and steel industry, the local economic elites merged
two of the largest enterprises into Altos Hornos de Vizcaya, which became a
dominant firm oligopoly on the Spanish market. Investment also increased in
the electricity (with the founding of Hidroele´ctrica Ibe´rica, Hidroele´ctrica
Espan˜ola, Unio´n Ele´ctrica Vizcaı´na), shipbuilding (Compan˜ı´a Euskalduna)
and the shipping sectors (Naviera Sota y Aznar, Naviera Vascongada, Mar-
ı´tima Unio´n, Marı´tima del Nervio´n). The capitalization of Biscayan economy
had received an important boost in 1898 with the repatriation of Spanish
capital from Cuba and the Philippines. Valdaliso (1993, pp. 167-8) has cal-
culated that 18 per cent of the capital invested in joint-stock companies
between 1886 and 1913 was provided by indianos (repatriates).
We have found no annual data on trade volumes for Barcelona, but we
have located comparisons for two moments of time for all three exchanges.
In 1925, the volume of stock trade was as follows: Barcelona Stock
Exchange: 856 million; Mercado Libre de Barcelona: 400 million; BSE:
221 million and Madrid: 990 million. Public stock trading in 1930 was 523
million on the Barcelona Stock Exchange; 665 million on the Madrid Stock
Exchange and 70 million on the BSE13.
From the end of the 19th century up to the World War I the BSE
experienced a gradual transformation from a small market, which traded
predominantly in public debt and state monopoly stocks, into an important
market in equity securities. As shown in Table 1, by the interwar period the
BSE had become a market basically focused on private bonds and shares.
Equity shares drove its trading, in contrast with Madrid, which retained
its traditional role of providing public finance. The traded volume of public
debt in Madrid was more than 50 per cent of the total volume during the
first third of the 20th century until the Spanish Civil War. In Bilbao, public
13 Comite´ Interventor del Mercado Bursa´til de Barcelona (1928), vol. II; Asociacio´n del Mercado
Libre de Valores, Anuario de 1930; Memoria de la Ca´mara de Comercio de Bilbao, 1925; Anuario
Financiero y de Sociedades Ano´nimas de Espan˜a, 1925.
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TABLE 2
TRADING VOLUME: BILBAO STOCK EXCHANGE, 1916-1935 (MILLIONS OF PESETAS)
1916-1919 1920-1923 1924-1927 1928-1931 1932-1935 Total
Fixed interest 415.60 391.86 583.55 510.76 272.63 2,174.40
Public debt 214.57 237.63 360.86 330.74 177.75 1,321.55
Company bonds 201.03 154.22 222.69 180.02 94.88 852.86
Equities 1,237.95 406.17 401.85 622.85 378.86 3,047.67
Banks 164.26 180.52 78.87 32.95 42.91 499.50
Railways 75.20 17.08 50.38 90.43 75.76 308.84
Shipping companies 428.42 31.97 28.84 36.39 28.83 554.45
Mining companies 63.17 7.38 55.95 43.71 10.17 180.38
Industry 482.47 159.19 133.69 318.05 143.22 1,236.62
Electricity 24.43 10.04 54.11 101.32 77.98 267.87
Total 1,653.54 798.03 985.40 1,133.61 651.50 5,222.07
Source: Memorias de la Ca´mara de Comercio, Industria y Navegacio´n de Bilbao.
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debt represented only a quarter of the total trading volume between 1916 and
1935 (see Table 2). The ratio of fixed income security trading to equity
trading remained fairly constant throughout the period, with a moderate
increase in the 1920s and a slight relative reduction in the early 1930s. Later,
it coincided with the general movement in trading. The overall pattern is a
strong expansion of equity trading during bull markets, especially in ship-
ping, industry and banks, accompanied by a lesser increase in bonds and
public debt. Both 1917-1920 and 1927-1930 showed sharp increases in
trading, mainly in equities. During downswings we observe inverse beha-
viour, strong decreases in equity trading and increases in the fixed interest
security share of trading. This reflects, as in other stock markets, both
speculation, due to the public’s obsession with making a quick fortune and
refuge into fixed interest securities during bear markets.
It is of particular interest to stress that by the World War I the BSE was
essentially an industrial exchange trading mainly in equities. Over the end of
the long 19th century the BSE had become increasingly specialized in
industrial and banking stock trading. The six top stocks in terms of trading
volume were industrial shares: Unio´n Resinera Espan˜ola (resin manu-
facturing industry), Altos Hornos de Vizcaya (iron and steel), Duro Felguera
(iron and steel), La Papelera Espan˜ola (paper), Sideru´rgica del Mediterra´neo
(iron and steel) and Unio´n Espan˜ola de Explosivos (explosives). All of these
industries operated their businesses nationwide. The industrial shares con-
stitute almost 24 per cent of total volume for the period examined: shipping
companies were around 11 per cent, but mainly because of intensive trading
in the immediate post-war years14. Banks were next in importance with
approximately 10 per cent of total trading, mostly in the 1920-1923 spec-
ulative bubble. Railways had a share of almost 6 per cent, but most of the
company bonds in circulation and of the 16 per cent of total trading volume
in company bonds were railway bonds. Both national railway companies,
such as Caminos de Hierro del Norte de Espan˜a [FC Norte] and Ferrocarriles
de Madrid a Zaragoza y Alicante [FC MZA] and smaller regional railroads,
such as Ferrocarril de Bilbao a Portugalete, Ferrocarril de Santander a Bil-
bao and Ferrocarriles Vascongados were traded. Electricity as a business
matured over the period examined, especially from the 1920s on and equities
in this sector reached an average of 5 per cent and a maximum of 11 per cent
of trading in the mid 1930s. Mining companies represented around 3 per
cent of total volume. They were characterized by their low levels of capita-
lization, heavy foreign business interests and the precipitous fall in the
international demand for Spanish iron ore at the beginning of the 20th
century15. Very large state-sponsored monopoly enterprises were created
towards the end of the 1920s, Telefo´nica (telecommunication sector) and
14 For the evolution of the shipping sector, see Valdaliso (1991).
15 See Montero (1990) and Escudero (1998) for a more detailed description of the mining cycle.
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CAMPSA (petroleum industry), can be included in that list. They explain
both the important increase of industrial trading in Bilbao in 1928-1931
(Table 2) and the exceptional predominance of equity share trading in
Madrid in that period (Table 1). Overall, trade volume was multiplied by
more than six during the period 1916-1935 in Madrid and was 2.7 times
higher than at the beginning in 1935, whereas in Bilbao it never doubled and
was only slightly above its initial level in 1935 (index 112). This definitely
points out that Madrid’s capital markets were strongly expanding after 1923
as a consequence of nation building and the agglomeration of financial
fortunes in the State’s capital and that Bilbao was bound to a much slower
expansion by its heavy industry-tied growth.
4. THE BSE INDEXES
We have calculated a battery of stock exchange indexes to perform com-
parisons with other exchanges in Spain and a detailed analysis of market evo-
lution. For this purpose, we have collected daily closing price quotes of stocks
traded for all listed equities on the BSE from its origins in February 1891 to
18 July 1936 (sessions were suspended then due to the outbreak of the Spanish
Civil War). Data from 1891 to 1913 were taken directly from the official stock
exchange registers and from 1914 to July 1936 information was taken from the
Bilbao Chamber of Commerce’s official journal, Informacio´n, which published
fortnightly summaries of closing price quotes and traded quantities. Missing
summaries have been reconstructed with quotes and quantities taken directly
from the official daily stock exchange bulletin. Quotes from stock exchange
sessions, including the closing price and total amount of each stock traded, were
recorded in a daily trade summary drafted and published by the Stock
Exchange authorities. These were the quotes published by Informacio´n. These
have been contrasted to be the closing prices in the official registers, that is, the
last quote — el u´ltimo cambio16. Missing data have been completed and outliers
have been double checked with the original stock market bulletins. The sum-
maries in Informacio´n also include information on the daily traded quantities of
each stock expressed in current pesetas, from which we were also able to infer
the number of shares traded17. This information is quite unique for the period
we are examining and has been useful both for constructing the weighted
liquidity and capitalization price index from 1914 to 1936 and for fitting models
to returns in other ongoing research (see Battilossi and Houpt 2006, 2009).
The long index, ranging from February 1891 to July 1936, represented in
Figure 1 is a monthly unweighted price index. Figure 1 plots the index
16 The Real Orden de 1 de Julio de (1916) explicitly prohibited newspapers and magazines from
publishing quotes other than those published in the official stock market bulletin.
17 According to our primary source, the value reported was in fact equal to the number of stocks
traded multiplied by the nominal paid-up capital of each stock.
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together with the monthly series available for Barcelona, Madrid, and annual
series for Santander and Valencia. Two forces motivate this index: detailed
information on shares issued and paid out capital are not easily available for
the period before World War I and, more important still, all other high-
frequency Spanish stock indexes for the time period before World War I are
monthly unweighted average price indexes and any comparisons we would
like to perform oblige us to use this type of index.
The long unweighted BSE index averages the end-of-the-month quotes of
five equities in 1891 and increases that to eleven by 1900. We maintain
eleven securities until 1914 and from 1914 to 1936 we increase the average
to twenty equities. For the latter period these are the most regular, most
liquid and most highly capitalized shares that are traded18. The index is
calculated as a mean of the equity price series expressed in percentages of
their nominal share value. The series have been rescaled to levels when
FIGURE 1
THE UNWEIGHTED MONTHLY BILBAO STOCK EXCHANGE INDEX TOGETHER
WITH THE AVAILABLE INDEXES FOR BARCELONA, MADRID, SANTANDER AND
VALENCIA — FEBRUARY 1891 TO JULY 1936 (19135 100)
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Sources: Revista de la Bolsa de Madrid (1994), Gutie´rrez Sebares (2001), Martı´nez Me´ndez (2008) and
Cuevas (2009).
18 They are almost the same as those included in the weighted indexes we have calculated. For
the unweighted index we have maintained stocks included before 1914 to avoid an unnecessary
number of entrances and exits of equities in the index.
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entering the index to avoid sudden jumps but maintaining their variation
with respect to the previous month. From 1900 all five Spanish indexes
evolved similarly in levels. World War I introduced strong deviations in
Bilbao, Santander and Barcelona. Whereas Bilbao and Santander returned
to common levels, Barcelona remained around 50 per cent below for the rest
of the period.
Our point of departure for calculating both weighted and unweighted
indexes was to select those equities — 265 in all — that showed a regular
trading frequency at some point between 1914 and 1936: sixteen bank
securities, twenty-one railway stocks, fifty electrical securities, thirty-two
mining company shares, forty-six shipping company stocks and 100 indus-
trial securities. We then went on to assume that the high incidence of
very infrequent trading can be regarded as evidence for thin markets.
Including a high number of these infrequently traded stocks in the market
index would considerably reduce variance in the returns, thus introducing a
strong bias in favour of stability. In this case, there was a clear trade-off
between including an important number of equities in the index and calcu-
lating an index that reflects the volatility of this secondary capital market. We
sidestepped this trade-off by calculating three different indexes: two market
indexes similar to those used today — a price-weighted Dow Jones-type index
and a capitalization-weighted Standard and Poor’s-type index — and a third
comprehensive index that covers an important amount (sixty-five) of the
regularly traded stocks to see how their par value evolved over time. In order
to calculate all three indexes we decided to exclude the stocks that reported
trading prices and volumes for less than twelve out of the twenty-six possible
fortnights for any of the years between 1914 and 1936. We hereby reduced
the approximately 265 reported equities to 101. Even within this reduced
sample, however, the problem of infrequent trading persisted as a possible
source of bias. For this reason, we focused on weekly rather than daily
observations in an attempt to reduce the slippage stemming from daily
sampling yields without sacrificing too many observations19. For these 101
series we then identified when equities quoted prices regularly on a weekly
basis throughout prolonged periods and chose the sixty-five most regular
stocks. Finally, we extrapolated price information for those weeks in which
they did not quote20.
These sixty-five equities have been the basis for the calculation of all the
indexes constructed for the period 1914-1936 and the complete listing is
19 «Our choice of a weekly observation interval was determined by several considerations.
Since our sampling theory is based wholly on asymptotic approximations, a large number of
observations is appropriate. While daily sampling yields many observations, the biases associated
with non-trading, the bid-ask spread, asynchronous prices, etc. are troublesome. Weekly sampling is
the ideal compromise, yielding a large number of observations while minimizing the biases inherent
in daily data» (Lo and MacKinlay 2001, pp. 26-27).
20 We maintain the last price quoted.
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given in Houpt and Rojo Cagigal (2010)21. We have also used these sixty-five
stocks to construct a comprehensive BSE-65 index that weights each of the
price series by their paid out capitalization and uses price series expressed as
the percentage of the price quote in terms of the paid-out share. This index
therefore shows «above par» or «below par» market valuation for the basket
of all the issued shares of these sixty-five equities22. Figure 2 presents this
monthly BSE-65 between 1916 and July 1936.
If we concentrate on the par level of 100, we find that the basket of the
sixty-five most regularly traded stocks fell below its paid-out value between
December 1920 and April 1928 and after July 1931. It came very close to the
50 per cent level in June 1936. Strikingly, the value of the basket remains
below par value for most of the period analysed, the exception being the two
booms. Compared to the BSE unweighted index this index is less volatile and
more sluggish, especially in the expansion phases, but it sheds an interesting
light on the joint performance of the sixty-five more regularly traded stocks
over time.
FIGURE 2
BILBAO STOCK EXCHANGE-65 CAPITALIZATION WEIGHTED MONTHLY
INDEX — JANUARY 1916 TO JULY 1936
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These same selected sixty-five stocks have also been used to construct a
twenty-equity market index weighted by capitalization and driven by
liquidity and capitalization for 1914-1936, which we have called ILC-20. The
most liquid and most highly capitalized securities available in the BSE at
each point of time have been used to construct a capitalization-weighted
index. This index has been left in store until its counterparts for Barcelona,
Madrid or Valencia become available.
All indexes for the interwar period have been calculated both weekly and
monthly. The equities included in the index driven by liquidity and capita-
lization have also been the basis for constructing an unweighted index and
moving it back in time to the very origins of the exchange. This is the long
BSE index introduced earlier. Moving back in time we have tried to maintain
both criteria of including regular trading stocks and avoiding an excessive
number of entrances and exits. Houpt and Rojo Cagigal (2010) provide a
detailed summary of the stocks that are included.
5. ASSESSING PERFORMANCE
Of the three indexes calculated to date, the long BSE unweighted index,
the BSE-65 weighted index and ILC-20 weighted index — the latter two for
the interwar period only — we will now examine in more detail the simplest,
longest and easiest to compare: the long BSE unweighted index. A first
approximation to assessing its performance is a long-term comparison with
other macroeconomic series that are exposed to the same economic funda-
mentals. Figure 3 shows the monthly unweighted BSE index together with
Spanish GDP and the Spanish and Basque Country Industrial Production
Index. We see that up to the World War I, the BSE index follows the common
trend of GDP at factor costs, the national industrial production index and the
Basque Country industrial production index with slight oscillations above
and below their levels. From that point on, we can distinguish two periods.
A speculative phase that continued beyond the War and a readjustment
phase in which the index aligns with the Basque industrial production index
calculated by Parejo Barranco (2004). These findings suggest two inter-
pretations: first, the BSE index follows the common economic trend up to
the World War I both in terms of the general economic cycle and industrial
production; and second, after the War the index is strongly tied to the evo-
lution of industrial production both anticipating and following its move-
ment. This underlines our perception of the BSE index as an industrial index
that reflects an exchange in which investors are exposed primarily to the
industrial business cycle.
A second approach to contrasting the verisimilitude of the index is dis-
aggregating it into sectoral indexes and comparing them to those that exist
for Barcelona and Madrid. We hereby try to examine whether the indexes’
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components were driven by similar forces and where existing differences
could stem from.
Four sectors mark a difference during the World War I interlude: bank-
ing, industry, electricity and shipping. The status of neutrality during the
War was especially favourable to Bilbao, the closest major Atlantic port to
the contending nations. The primary beneficiaries were mixed banks with
heavy interests in industry and electricity but mainly the shipping industry,
which made enormous profits with skyrocketing freight rates (Figure 4).
Railways, on the other hand, follow the same overall decline of activity
experienced throughout Spain. It was more pronounced in Bilbao as some of
the railways included in its index were tied to mining activities that initiated
their final phase of depletion during the first third of the century. This explains
both their higher initial level and their faster fall. The short recovery in the late
1920s would be tied to the overall stock exchange boom in those years. Rail-
ways received their coup de graˆce when the Second Republic withheld all the
support they had received from previous administrations. Throughout the
1930s they faced growing competition from road transport, falling revenues
and had little room for manoeuvre for reducing expenditures.
Electricity was definitely one of the more dynamic sectors, both in levels
and trends. Reinvestment opportunities from other sectors in Bilbao during the
War boom explain the early differences with Madrid. Both indexes move in
FIGURE 3
BILBAO STOCK EXCHANGE VS. ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL GROWTH —
1891-1936 (18915 100)
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unison thereafter. The same co-movement holds true for industry, especially
when we separate mining activity, in clear retrocession. We find that the dif-
ference with other Spanish indexes can be traced back to the World War I boom
driven by the favourable conditions it provided especially for shipping; the
higher incidence of mining stocks and the earlier move into the electricity sector.
Overall, the index appears reasonable in these sectoral comparisons. See
Appendix (Table A1) for the annual sectoral series used in these comparisons.
FIGURE 4
ANNUAL SECTORAL INDEXES: BILBAO, MADRID AND BARCELONA (19135 100)
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6. TESTING FOR CAPITAL MARKET INTEGRATION BETWEEN
BILBAO, MADRID AND BARCELONA: 1891-1936
Having established a certain consistency for the Bilbao index, this part
of our analysis examines the degree of integration of the BSE with the other
two major stock exchanges for which we have equivalent data23. A second
question to be assessed is the evolution of secondary market integration
over time.
Our point of departure is the assumption that two trading markets are
integrated if price changes in one market are manifested in a price response
similar in magnitude and direction to another. We are therefore testing
the smooth transmission of price signals and information across spatially
separated markets. Specifically, we are concerned with finding whether
assets of equal risk provide investors with the same expected return across
integrated markets. We will perform two tests for market integration: a
macro test to see whether the index series for the three markets are coin-
tegrated and a micro test in which we examine the integration of quotes for
sixteen equities listed on both the Madrid and Bilbao market for the period
we previously identified as integrated.
6.1. Macro test
This section examines the stock market integration in the major sec-
ondary capital markets before the Spanish Civil War: Barcelona, Bilbao and
Madrid. We use the unweighted monthly indexes available for the three
exchanges to apply cointegration tests between February 1891 and July
193624. Cointegration will test for long-run co-movement in the indexes,
which the literature has associated with market integration; in particular,
the existence of cointegration between stock price indexes has been attrib-
uted to a reduction of spatial restrictions on stock investment and ownership,
contagion behaviour between markets and strong economic ties within
regions (Chan et al. 1997; Kanas 1998)25. These forces should be increasingly
present during Spain’s slow economic catch-up with Europe — in the latter
part of the long 19th century — driven first by the dynamics of the first
23 Weekly series are not yet available for any of the other exchanges. The quarterly series
provided by Tafunell (1991) have been scrutinized by calculating quarterly series for Bilbao. The
results using quarterly data for Bilbao and Barcelona from 1891 to 1914 confirm those presented at
the end of this section.
24 Pairwise tests are presented in Houpt and Rojo Cagigal (2010).
25 See also Choudhry (1996) who sustains that multivariate long-run relationships are due to
some underlying factors which systematically affect all markets: deregulation and liberalization of
markets, improvement and development of communication technology, activities of interregional
companies, interregional investors, interregional trade or trade imbalance, reduced inflation and
lower nominal interest rates.
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globalization and in the interwar period impelled by the growing availability
of information and emergent democratization in the 1930s. As mentioned
above, the three series submitted to testing are monthly. The index for
Barcelona is taken from Martı´nez Me´ndez (2008). It is the eight equity
unweighted index calculated by Prat de la Riba (1936) for January 1880 to
December 1913 spliced with the twenty-two equity unweighted index based on
monthly averages of daily spot market quotes calculated by the Institut
d’Investigacio´ns Econo`miques from January 1916 to July 1936 (Martı´nez
Me´ndez 2008). The series for Madrid is taken from Revista de la Bolsa de
Madrid (1994). It is an unweighted index that uses monthly averages for up
to sixty-two equities over the time period considered. Finally, the Bilbao
unweighted index is a based on five–eleven–twenty equity price series registering
their last monthly quote26.
Finding cointegration would confirm that the indexes move together over
the long run with occasional short-run divergences that adjust back to a
common path as one would expect in integrated markets. If the Spanish
national economy at the time was moving from a number of segregated
regional markets towards a single national market, we could also expect to
find a growing integration of the Spanish financial markets27.
Table 3 summarizes some of the standard descriptive statistics.
We begin by testing for the presence of unit roots in the individual
indexes using the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test and the Philipps–
Peron (PP) test in levels and in first differences with and without constant
and trend28. Non-stationarity is a necessary precondition for cointegration,
just as all series must be integrated in the same order. The null of the unit
root cannot be rejected in levels as the values of the ADF and PP statistics are
above the 99 per cent critical values; the series in first differences allow us to
reject the null hypothesis of the unit root under all three specifications. We
conclude that all indexes are non-stationary of order I(1)29 (Table 4).
The Johansen procedure has been used to test for long-run relationships
between indexes. This test is based on the maximum likelihood estimation
of the vector error correction model and determines the rank of the coeffi-
cient matrix of a vector autoregression of the series, with the rank indi-
cating whether there is cointegration as well as the number of cointegration
relationships. Lag lengths have been determined by the Akaike informa-
tion criterion, which is indicated in each panel together with Schwartz
26 Following Richards (1995, p. 637), all series are ex-dividend to allow for cointegration.
27 Over the recent years, developed equity markets have become progressively more integrated
than emerging markets. The measure of market segmentation tends to be larger for emerging
markets than the developed markets, which is consistent with larger barriers to capital flows into or
out of emerging markets ( Gilmore et al. 2008, p. 20).
28 We add PP tests because they incorporate an automatic correction to allow for auto-
correlated residuals.
29 This result applies to the time series with and without trend and/or constant.
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information criterion. Table 5 indicates that there is no significant evidence
of a cointegration relationship between Spanish exchanges over the entire
period30.
For the 1920s, the three exchanges are strongly cointegrated and converge
in the sense that two indexes can be expressed in terms of another index.
Even though these regional markets are dispersed and spatially segmented,
prices are linked together indicating that they form a single market. The
1930s show a reversal with barely significant evidence for one cointegration
relation and significance depending on the specification. Additional caution
is required as there may be a small sample bias resulting from the use of only
sixty-seven observations, which would lead us to under-reject the existence of
cointegration relations when they indeed do not exist.
Although we do find some evidence for market integration in the 1920s,
we must conclude that for the major part of the period examined markets
were mainly driven by regional domestic factors. The statistical exercises
have been performed with all available series. None of these alternative
contrasts alter our results in any way. Linkages between equity markets may
be time varying and episodic and this would require a method that detects
structural breaks such as those applied by Gregory and Hansen (1996) or
Escribano and A´ngel (2000). This is something we may examine when we
have completed a weekly index for Madrid and Barcelona at some point in
the future.
TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR BARCELONA, BILBAO AND MADRID MONTHLY
STOCK INDEXES, 1891-1936
Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Barcelona 78.82 72.20 126.40 49.80
Bilbao 122.77 108.29 300.39 75.23
Madrid 109.51 107.17 216.26 50.06
SD Skewness Kurtosis Jarque
Bera
Barcelona 18.41 0.43 2.02 38.02
Bilbao 44.97 1.69 5.19 36.30
Madrid 32.06 0.83 4.29 98.70
30 We have performed the same exercises substituting the series for Barcelona with data from
Hortala` i Arau (1999, 2004) and using quarterly data from Tafunell (1991). None of these sub-
stitutions change the result of no cointegration relationship over the whole period or before 1913.
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6.2. Microtest
A second test — to confirm our findings of higher market integration for
the 1920s — is performed at a micro level. In other words, we test whether
quotes for the same stock in Bilbao and Madrid adjust to the same price
between 1918 and 1933. To this end we collected the monthly closing price
for sixteen frequently traded stocks that were traded on both exchanges.
Financial theory suggests that under competitive market assumptions —
large number of traders, perfect competition and no transaction costs —
there should be no room for systematic arbitrage profits. If markets are fully
integrated the law of one price should hold, that is, in the long run we should
observe pt
Madrid5pt
Bilbao. In other words, although each asset prices follow
random walk processes and despite the obvious objections to perfect com-
petition conditions (in practice there are risk-averse agents, transaction
delays, imperfect and asymmetrical information and constraints on stock
trading), it would be reasonable to assume asset prices as I(1) processes and
the difference between them as I(0) processes.
TABLE 4
UNIT ROOT TESTS
Level First difference
Index 1 2 3 1 2 3
Madrid
1875.01-1936.07 ADF 22.03 23.24 20.19 27.47* 7.51* 25.95*
lags 14 14 14 9 9 9
PP 21.88 22.27 0.02 224.20* 224.19* 224.23*
Barcelona
1880.01-1936.07 ADF 22.25 22.37 21.23 28.55* 28.54* 28.53*
lags 6 6 6 5 5 5
PP 22.03 22.24 20.85 222.32* 222.32* 222.33*
Bilbao
1891.01-1936.07 ADF 22.76 23.14 20.82 27.24* 27.25* 27.25*
lags 7 16 7 6 6 6
PP 22.48 22.67 20.72 216.98* 216.96* 216.99*
Notes: ADF: augmented Dickey–Fuller test; PP: Philipps–Peron test; 1: with constant; 2: with constant
and trend; 3: without constant and without trend.
Lag length for ADF is Akaike information criteria plus 2 (Pantula et al. 1994).
*Unit root hypothesis rejected at a 99% confidence level.
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TABLE 5
JOHANSEN COINTEGRATION TEST FOR MONTHLY STOCK INDEXES BARCELONA, BILBAO AND MADRID
Number of
cointegrating vectors Trace test
Maximum Eigenvalue
test
Barcelona–
Bilbao–Madrid Statistic 5% CV Statistic 5% CV Conclusio´n
Sensitivity specification
and lag length
Panel A: 1891.02-1936.07
0 19.952 29.797 9.940 21.131 No cointegration For all specifications
Lag L. AIC (4) SC (3)
1 10.012 15.494 6.813 14.264
2 3.198 3.841 3.198 3.841
Panel B: 1920.01-1936.07
0 49.904 29.797 38.655 21.131
1 11.249 15.494 9.196 14.264 One cointegration
equation
For all specifications
Lag L. AIC (4) SC (2)
2 2.052 3.841 2.052 3.841
Panel C: 1920.01-1929.12
0 44.153 29.797 36.181 21.131
1 7.972 15.494 6.358 14.264 One cointegration
equation
All specifications except I
& T which have two
2 1.614 3.841 1.614 3.841 Lag L. AIC (9) SC (2)
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TABLE 5 (Cont.)
Panel D: 1930.01-1936.07
0 29.937 29.797 21.408 21.131
1 8.529 15.494 6.043 14.264 One cointegration
equation
For no-I, no-T & I no-T
Lag L. AIC (2) SC (1)
2 2.486 3.841 2.486 3.841
Note: we have applied possible specifications with and without intercept [I]/trend [T] in the cointegrating term and with or without intercept in VAR
equations. The results shown here are for intercept in the cointegration and the test Vector Auto-Regression [VAR].
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This can be tested by proceeding as follows: first, we will contrast whether
the individual price series are stationary I(1) processes. Then we will go on to
define a difference series pt
Madrid2pt
Bilbao as ut. If we find ut to be I(0) — a
stationary process — the Madrid and Bilbao price series can be considered
cointegrated. What this suggests is that there is a long-term equilibrium,
where pt
Madrid and pt
Bilbao may fluctuate differently in the short run, but
their long-run equilibrium relationship will maintain both series united.
The short-run error correction mechanism corrects deviations. This will be
discussed in the following section.
The data set used is consists of time series of the monthly closing price
quotes for the shares of sixteen high-trading companies from January 1918
to December 1933. The data were collected from previously quoted sources
and financial yearbooks that published the official quotes for the stocks on
the Madrid Stock Exchange31.
We use the ADF test to contrast whether the price of each share was an
I(1) process when considered in level. The null hypothesis — the series has a
unit root — is accepted in favour of non-stationarity for all shares’ prices in
levels. In the second step, we ran OLS regressions and unit root tests on the
residuals32:
pBilbaot ¼ aþ bpMadridt þ ut ½1
With the exception of the CHADE series the data showed that t statistics
for all shares’ residuals were less than the critical value, allowing us in all
other cases to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. Columns two through
five show that the share quotes for both exchanges are non-stationary.
Columns six and seven report on the b-coefficient of the OLS regression,
which defines the long-run relationship between Bilbao quotes and Madrid.
The cases of high statistical significance show that the expected coefficients
are very close to one. Columns eight and nine show the ADF test results
for the residuals from the regression. Of the sixteen equities, two have an
insufficient number of observations to perform the test, CHADE does not
allow rejecting the unit root test, the Banco de Espan˜a stocks reject the
hypothesis at a 95 per cent level and all other assets at a 99 per cent level.
The prices of 80 per cent of the examined shares traded in both Bilbao
and Madrid are cointegrated, that is, they move together in the long run
(Table 6).
31 The data for Madrid were collected from the Anuario Financiero y de Sociedades Ano´nimas.
32 As the test operates on the residual of an estimated model, we use the Engle–Granger
cointegration test with the critical values provided by Engle and Yoo in Brooks (2002), pp. 391-392
and 676. Critical values for two variables and more than 100 observations are 24 at 0.01 per cent,
23.37 at 0.05 per cent and 23.02 at 0.10 per cent.
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6.3. Error correction model
In order to identify the adjustment behaviour and dominance of markets
we have added a second contrast, a two-step Engle–Granger cointegration
exercise to identify the short-run adjustment behaviour of the two markets.
The model is defined by the following two equations:
DpBilbaot ¼ g1ECTBMt1 þ
Xn
i¼1
biDp
Madrid
ti þ Bilbaot ½2
DpMadridt ¼ g2ECTMBt1 þ
Xn
i¼1
biDp
Bilbao
ti þ Madridt ½3
where pt
Bilbao and pt
Madrid are the stock quotes in Bilbao and Madrid,
respectively, ECTt2 1
BM and ECTt2 1
MB are the residuals obtained from
estimating equation [1] lagged one period — ut2 1. The corresponding coef-
ficients, g1 and g2, measure the speed of adjustment of each price to the long-
run equilibrium relation.
Estimates for the fourteen company shares considered are presented in
Table 7. We show the estimated ECTt2 1 coefficients, g1 and g2, in column
five; they have an asterisk when they are significant at a 99 per cent level and
a double asterisk at a 95 per cent level. Columns seven through nine test the
regression residuals for autocorrelation (Breusch–Godfrey Serial Correlation
LM Test — no serial correlation up to order 2), heteroskedasticity (no ARCH
up to order 1) and normality (Jarque–Bera). These results are presented in
p-values. The number of lags for the RHS lagged variables is determined
using the Akaike and Schwartz information criteria.
In Bilbao the short-run behaviour of AHV, Banco Central, Banco de
Espan˜a, Banco Hispano Americano, CHADE, FC Norte, CAMPSA, FC MZA,
Rif, Sevillana de Electricidad and Explosivos — eleven of the fourteen stocks
— seems to adjust to deviations from the long-run equilibrium path. Seven of
these eleven stocks adjust rapidly at more than 50 per cent in one period.
There is no statistical evidence for adjustment in three stock quotes, Duro
Felguera, Hidroele´ctrica Espan˜ola and Telefo´nica and these can be considered
weakly exogenous.
In Madrid, only four stock quotes adjust to deviations: AHV, Banco
Central, Telefo´nica and Explosivos. The remaining ten stocks could be
treated as weakly exogenous. AHV is the only company with headquarters
in Bilbao — and important shareholders live in Madrid. All other compa-
nies have their headquarters in Madrid. These very different results do
not reflect a geographic component as found recently by Pirinsky and Wang
(2006) linking price formation first in the company’s home market. More-
over, they may reflect a higher degree of arbitrage in Bilbao, that is, dif-
ferent trading patterns in equity markets in Bilbao. Similarly, the reaction
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TABLE 6
COINTEGRATION TEST BILBAO AND MADRID STOCK EXCHANGES FIFTEEN COMMONLY TRADED SHARES, 1918-1933
Stock exchange Regression Unit root test
Bilbao Madrid Residual
Company t-statistic Probabilty t-statistic Probabilty Coefficient t-statistic t-statistic Probability
Banco Central 21.31 0.625 21.99 0.291 1 1 1 1
Banco Hispano Americano 22.04 0.269 21.53 0.515 1.01 87.13 212.17 0.000
Banco de Espan˜a 22.48 0.121 22.27 0.182 0.88 25.90 23.63 0.006
Hidroele´ctrica Espan˜ola 22.86 0.052 20.99 0.752 0.99 109.73 29.48 0.000
CHADE 22.03 0.275 21.93 0.319 1.00 32.15 22.16* 0.223*
Sevillana 23.34 0.015 21.38 0.587 1.01 40.15 28.50 0.000
MZA 0.04 0.960 21.06 0.731 0.98 89.54 25.32 0.000
Norte 20.20 0.935 21.03 0.743 1.00 269.42 213.83 0.000
Rif Nominativo 21.3E106 0.639 20.78 0.819 1.00 86.89 29.35 0.000
Rif Portador 21.9E106 0.314 21.3E106 0.639 0.96 71.94 28.94 0.000
AHV 22.2E106 0.224 22.96 0.041 0.99 270.12 29.24 0.000
Duro Felguera 21.4E106 0.588 22.6E106 0.104 1.03 107.50 29.32 0.000
UE Explosivos 21.5E106 0.545 21.3E106 0.649 1.00 413.47 26.63 0.000
SECN 20.17 0.938 1 1 0.90 23.71 1 1
Telefo´nica 20.81 0.812 21.5E106 0.538 0.98 45.77 26.54 0.000
CAMPSA 21.7E106 0.415 21.8E106 0.383 0.98 52.04 27.14 0.000
Notes: 1insufficient number of observations; * unit root test for OLS regression residuals that cannot be rejected.
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TABLE 7
ERROR CORRECTION MODEL FOR FOURTEEN COMPANY STOCKS TRADED ON THE BILBAO [B] AND MADRID [M]
STOCK EXCHANGES, 1918-1933 (MONTHLY OBSERVATIONS)
Error correction term Residual tests (P-values)
OBS LAGS R2 c SE AR 1-2 ARCH1 B–J Norm
DAHV-B 118 3 0.147 0.632* 0.181 0.686 0.004 0.084
DAHV-M 118 3 0.342 21.715* 0.206 0.275 0.000 0.000
DBanco Central-B 115 1 0.320 20.180* 0.042 0.794 0.891 0.000
DBanco Central-M 115 1 0.058 20.124** 0.050 0.021 0.042 0.000
DBanco de Espan˜a-B 191 1 0.121 20.208* 0.049 0.031 0.969 0.000
DBanco de Espan˜a-M 191 1 0.003 20.026 0.045 0.359 0.440 0.000
DBanco Hispano Americano-B 183 2 0.215 20.809* 0.134 0.110 0.308 0.000
DBanco Hispano Americano-M 183 2 0.015 0.015 0.107 0.008 0.976 0.000
DCHADE-B 48 1 0.204 20.767* 0.262 0.548 0.046 0.279
DCHADE-M 48 1 0.037 20.046 0.257 0.235 0.284 0.174
DDuro Felguera-B 187 1 0.013 0.204 0.112 1.000 0.161 0.000
DDuro Felguera-M 187 1 0.307 20.720 0.113 1.000 0.478 0.000
DFC Norte-B 191 1 0.159 20.129* 0.221 0.659 0.882 0.000
DFC Norte-M 191 1 0.011 0.324 0.220 0.287 0.610 0.000
DHidroele´ctrica Espan˜ola-B 71 1 0.017 20.295 0.426 0.891 0.000 0.013
DHidroele´ctrica Espan˜ola-M 71 1 0.102 20.640 0.417 0.523 0.000 0.000
DCAMPSA-B 59 1 0.171 20.817* 0.227 1.000 0.623 0.391
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TABLE 7 (Cont.)
Error correction term Residual tests (P-values)
OBS LAGS R2 c SE AR 1-2 ARCH1 B–J Norm
DCAMPSA-M 59 1 0.060 20.480 0.246 0.159 0.815 0.141
DFC MZA-B 191 1 0.089 20.207* 0.070 0.870 0.795 0.000
DFC MZA-M 191 1 0.012 20.017 0.069 0.220 0.810 0.000
DRif Portador-B 61 3 0.230 21.217* 0.286 0.828 0.804 0.202
DRif Portador-M 61 3 0.040 0.141 0.288 1.000 0.388 0.272
D Sevillana de Electricidad-B 56 1 0.417 20.811* 0.166 0.458 0.880 0.000
D Sevillana de Electricidad-M 56 1 0.195 20.028 0.137 0.007 0.427 0.297
DTelefo´nica-B 78 1 0.075 20.461 0.300 0.059 0.000 0.000
DTelefo´nica-M 78 1 0.155 20.604** 0.307 0.670 0.006 0.000
DUE Explosivos-B 190 2 0.228 22.916* 0.510 0.869 0.000 0.000
DUE Explosivos-M 190 2 0.138 2.149* 0.512 0.139 0.000 0.000
Notes: * significant at a 99% level. ** significant at a 95% level.
S
T
E
F
A
N
H
O
U
P
T
/JU
A
N
C
A
R
L
O
S
R
O
JO
C
A
G
IG
A
L
566
R
e
v
is
ta
d
e
H
is
to
ria
E
c
o
n
o´
m
ic
a
,
J
o
u
rn
a
l
o
f
lb
e
ria
n
a
n
d
L
a
tin
A
m
e
ric
a
n
E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
H
is
to
ry
of the BSE is more dynamic than in Madrid33. As a working hypothesis
we may propose that the stock exchanges linked to a dynamic industrial
product, labour and capital markets, such as those to be found in Catalonia
and the Basque Country, showed a higher degree of efficiency in adjusting
to deviations from the long-run equilibrium path they shared with
Madrid34. Regulation does not explain these differences because during the
time period considered all three exchanges were governed by much the
same institutions.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the first part of this analysis, we have been able to trace the origins of
the BSE to a manoeuver to secure monopoly rights in public debt trading
made by a privileged group of brokers at the right moment in time and
question the a priori hypothesis that the exchange’s formation responded
to the capital needs of a nascent industrial region. In the following section,
we have described how the BSE evolved into a truly industrial exchange
tied to the regional business cycle of Basque industry. Strangely enough,
the highly traded securities included in the indexes we have estimated
represent firms that did their business on a national level. This may imply
either that the Basque economy was driven by national industry or that the
Basque economy was driving national industry — the first option being
more credible.
The last part of the research we present here examines the degree of
Spanish capital market integration in the case of its three most important
exchanges. When comparing the existing indexes for Bilbao, Barcelona
and Madrid, we find some evidence for market integration in the 1920s,
but for the rest of the period examined markets seem mainly driven by
regional domestic factors. Given that contrasts with all possible specifi-
cations and all alternative series reconstructed over the last decades
confirm our findings, we maintain this as our main result. On a micro
level we confirm market integration in the 1920s and find that the BSE,
linked to a dynamic industrial area, showed a higher degree of efficiency
in adjusting to deviations from the long-run equilibrium path shared
with Madrid. Nevertheless, our findings at the present state of analysis
put general capital market integration in Spain before 1920 very much
in doubt.
33 An alternative explanation is that Madrid stockbrokers had their funds tied up primarily in
forward contracts on the stock of government debt, which played a much bigger role in the trading
activity of Madrid than it did in Bilbao. This could be why Bilbao stockbrokers responded more
quickly to price divergences. (We would like to thank one of the anonymous referees of the article
for this idea.)
34 This needs to be formally contrasted with data from Catalonia.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1
BILBAO ANNUAL UNWEIGHTED GENERAL INDEX AND SECTORAL INDEXES, 1891-1936.
General Banking Railways Electricity Mining Industry Shipping
1891 68.17 49.28 135.71 47.46
1892 72.26 51.09 144.02 44.82
1893 80.47 57.66 148.95 43.77
1894 84.37 64.10 154.51 41.25
1895 81.78 65.58 140.44 37.50
1896 75.13 64.61 113.26 38.39
1897 77.68 74.43 103.31 69.85
1898 80.46 80.51 113.81 68.27
1899 104.89 83.58 191.71 94.53 149.00
1900 110.48 94.85 206.91 154.70 140.75 129.00
1901 95.82 83.87 185.64 132.60 140.16 94.00
1902 86.97 71.45 175.69 85.08 138.98 70.00
1903 95.22 85.44 143.92 85.08 142.47 62.00
1904 88.83 77.16 140.33 99.45 131.47 62.00
1905 93.02 81.79 146.96 120.72 121.67 61.00
1906 96.69 88.79 142.54 132.60 112.36 47.00
1907 99.16 95.96 133.70 109.94 106.17 48.50
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TABLE A1 (Cont.)
General Banking Railways Electricity Mining Industry Shipping
1908 109.82 115.83 123.76 116.02 106.34 47.00
1909 130.11 162.82 111.33 140.33 102.64 40.00
1910 127.24 159.04 111.05 130.39 104.02 32.00
1911 112.62 127.44 97.24 96.13 101.50 97.00
1912 112.96 122.27 102.21 107.73 103.70 105.00
1913 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1914 76.98 68.98 93.37 103.74 66.30 74.33 126.00
1915 103.95 71.83 69.61 131.88 66.30 82.58 535.00
1916 139.27 107.39 77.35 192.72 70.00 107.02 672.00
1917 249.29 157.16 89.24 275.57 69.02 129.54 1,555.90
1918 240.77 155.94 87.94 253.50 68.15 139.79 1,011.25
1919 296.28 293.70 82.29 288.44 32.75 212.13 1,014.54
1920 154.03 128.99 72.19 169.54 28.81 150.64 298.79
1921 113.08 92.68 64.05 72.14 6.20 126.78 141.52
1922 112.10 104.49 70.76 89.03 8.02 128.18 140.06
1923 117.89 126.44 77.37 141.51 50.97 134.23 154.53
1924 117.30 124.01 75.37 140.65 46.54 148.37 175.89
1925 113.14 71.29 82.63 140.56 33.53 147.15 160.98
1926 124.94 69.24 88.99 141.85 33.53 131.10 186.73
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TABLE A1 (Cont.)
1927 170.25 98.18 96.25 186.54 42.63 103.10 232.55
1928 212.83 116.46 114.56 293.30 77.03 198.08 301.54
1929 215.84 152.19 115.21 318.71 68.69 217.88 332.03
1930 209.65 151.62 112.75 336.63 64.69 198.99 318.95
1931 140.78 108.16 67.85 196.52 39.73 147.40 254.51
1932 124.47 83.44 56.16 168.24 33.26 153.74 174.47
1933 145.71 88.06 57.55 155.81 28.72 124.87 128.17
1934 129.38 74.93 51.15 150.34 31.23 115.74 129.80
1935 157.90 87.69 48.69 177.37 33.84 139.64 181.91
1936 121.58 68.72 31.94 153.50 38.51 122.52 150.57
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